

STUDY PROJECT

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ROLE OF THE SENIOR LEADER IN PREPARATION FOR AIRLAND BATTLE


BY

LIEUTEMANT COLONEL WILLIAM T. VOSSLER

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ROLE OF THE SENIOR LEADER IN PREPARATION FOR AIRLAND BATTLE

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

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ABSTRACT

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The current and future AirLand Battle environment poses significant changes to our methods of conducting battle. In order to be successful in this environment we must adhere to the tenets and imperatives for conduct of AirLand Battle as outlined in Field Manual 100-5. Our leadership doctrine and development programs must also make concomitant changes in order to keep pace with the changed battlefield environment. Senior Army leaders must play a key role in the leadership process. This study answers the question: "Given the current and future AirLand Battle environment, what must the senior leader do within his command to insure that successful wartime leadership traits are trained and learned by his subordinate leaders?" This study begins with an examination of the doctrinal requirements for AirLand Battle and a vision of the AirLand Battle environment. The leadership implications within that environment are then addressed and an assessment made of what we must add, delete, or change within our leadership methods and programs in order to be successful. The Senior leader's role in implementing those changes is then discussed and recommendations are made in answering the question stated above.

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ROLE OF THE SENIOR LEADER IN PREPARATION FOR AIRLAND BATTLE

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

It is my intent in this paper to answer the question: "Given the current and future AirLand Battle environment, what must a senior leader do within his command in peacetime to insure that successful wartime leadership traits are trained and learned by his subordinate leaders?

This question presupposes several tough questions and issues concerning leadership and AirLand Battle doctrine. It is my contention that we, the Army leadership, have not done all that we can to educate our subordinate leaders, and to some extent ourselves, on the nature of the AirLand battlefield and the leadership challenges which it poses. Although tenets and imperatives of doctrine have been introduced to us in Field Manual 100-5, and various professional articles have been written to expand these concepts, the mainstream of Army leaders have yet to fully and personally come to grips with what this means in terms of effect on our battlefield operations. One senior Army leader put it in this context:

FM 100-5 [AirLand Battle] is not just a lexicon of Army jargon. Maneuver warfare doctrine demands that the officer corps adopt new ways of thinking about combat and about how we will train our units to fight. Maneuver warfare means much more than movement or mobility. And it is not simply a technique that features decentralized risk-taking at every echelon. 1

Secondly, we have not yet totally mastered the leadership and

training methodology and environment which will properly prepare us for combat on that battlefield. Impediments to training and leader development still exist. These impediments are products of systemic inconsistencies in training and leader management Army wide. Additionally, lack of expertise in maximizing training value received for the amount of time and resources invested contribute to the problem.

Thirdly, we have not been able to uniformly apply the execution of that leader development and training under wartime conditions within the relative peacetime environment of the 1980's. This dilemma is not one created by AirLand Battle doctrine or new technology. Morris Janowitz first addressed it in 1975 when he wrote: "The Army lives with the fundamental dilemma of deterrence: the better prepared it is for battle, the less likely it will ever have to go to battle; but less likely it will go to battle, the more difficult it is to be prepared to do so." 2 Our exposure to two different organizational environments, one a reality and the other only a theoretical possibility, make it difficult to fully come to grips with the worst case possibility which a future war poses.

This paper will begin with an examination of the doctrinal requirements for leadership on the AirLand battlefield. Additionally, leadership behavior exhibited by successful past combat leaders which support the doctrine will be identified through analysis, comparison and example. The historical precedents and present and future leadership requirements will then be analyzed and contrasted with current leadership doctrine and climate to answer the question: "What must we sustain, improve, add, or delete from our current and future leadership methodology?" The role of the senior leader in

shaping his subordinates and preparing them for AirLand Battle will then be introduced, culminating in answers to the question stated in the thesis. Finally, conclusions will be stated and the implications of any differences between peacetime leadership training and results of the analysis will be explained.

Scope of this paper is fixed by the following parameters. First, the focus will be on indirect versus direct leadership requirements. As such, the term senior leader will be taken to mean those leaders at the level of brigade command and above. Although a brigade commander may not technically qualify for inclusion as a senior leader, his role in developing the company and battalion commanders within his command is an important part of the process. Secondly, geographically on the AirLand battlefield my frame of reference will be the close versus deep or rear operations with a focus on the operational and, to a lesser extent, tactical, versus strategic levels.

This limitation in scope is necessary to establish a sharp focus for analysis and discussion. Moreover, the geographical limitation is necessary because I believe this section of the AirLand battlefield to be the most crucial to success and the most difficult to grasp from a leadership perspective. In the words of David Segal:

"Most analyses of the new doctrine have emphasized the deep thrusts of the extended battlefield, almost to the exclusion of activities on the more traditional battlefield on which the first advancing hostile echelon is confronted... At a minimum, this is the zone from which our own offensive units will launch their deep thrusts into the unfriendly rear area. And it is the zone through which our deep-thrusting units will withdraw after battle. Without control of this battlefield, there will be no Air-Land Battle 2000." 3

CHAPTER II

DOCTRINAL REQUIREMENTS

Field Manual 100-5 provides us the basic tenets and operational imperatives for the preparation and conduct of AirLand Battle. The tenets of initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization are the four basic factors upon which success in battle will depend. The ten imperatives of AirLand Battle prescribe key operating requirements. The theoretical and practical understanding of these tenets and imperatives by our leaders is of course vital to our success. Yet, in a deeper sense, what is most important is an understanding by the leader of the battlefield environment he and his soldiers will be exposed to during the course of battle. The cognitive ability of the leader to deal with each decision and dilemma as it comes during the battle has always been important. However, the potentially high lethality, mobility and continuous nature of the AirLand battlefield make leadership abilities even more important.

A vision of the AirLand battlefield is essential in coming to grips with its operational and leadership requirements. David Segal describes it this way:

"The action of battle will be continuous, more akin by athletic analogy to soccer than to football. Battles will take place around the clock, over periods of days, not hours. Thus the stress under which personnel operate will be much greater than that we have known in past years. Danger will be ever present and fatigue will take its toll. The cognitive abilities of commanders are likely to decay faster that the physical abilities of their subordinates." 4

An examination of the doctrinal requirements for leadership on the AirLand battlefield is revealing. The increased depth and width of the battlefield combined with technological improvements in the mobility of land combat systems provide for increased fluidity and movement. According to T. Owen Jacobs, the result is a requirement for far better anticipation and reaction to opposing force actions and far more accurate readings of the flow of battle. Increased battlefleld fluidity, a derivative of mobility involving far greater capacity for intermixing of forces, will result in increased confusion of friend and foe. The operational leadership requirement will be a far greater challenge to tactical unit commanders to sort out the rapidly paced flow of events around them. This uncertainty factor will exacerbate the already high level of stress they will experience. 5

In overview, Jacobs maintains that, due to the depth of the battlefield, commanders at the level of the present corps may be concerned with events over a depth of more than 150 kilometers, from his own rear to the rear of the opposing force. Current and projected mobility may permit movement of friendly or enemy forces over that much terrain within a two or three day period. Because opposing force tactics emphasize the massing of extremely large forces to achieve penetration, friendly forces must have high agility, the capacity to move laterally on the battlefield to meet the opposing force. 6 Ominously enough, the ability of forces to rapidly move laterally in a highly fluid situation had already proven difficult enough 45 years ago. American forces, for example suffered heavily in attempts to move in this manner while countering the German offensive in the Ardenness during the winter of 1944-45.

The description of the 21st Century battlefield provided by TRADOC's Combined Arms Center serves to provide us with a vision

which magnifies the problems associated with mobility, agility, command and control, and leadership. Units will be at risk throughout a battlefield which will be non-linear in nature with poorly defined FEBA's and rear areas. Numerous, small, independent but coordinated battles will take place throughout the theater. This is much the same vision as provided in FM 100-5: "a thousand small unit leaders conducting a thousand independent, small battles throughout the battle area".

The Combined Arms Center's AirLand Battle Future also provides us with a vision of the new technologies possible on the battlefield in 15 years. 7 New generation communications systems and the Global Precision Location System will enhance command and control and hopefully assist in clearing the fog of war from the minds of the combatants. Fire and forget warheads, top-attack antitank missiles, extended range (100-150 KM) fire support systems, first generation directed energy weapons, and first generation kinetic energy weapons will add to the present day level of battlefield lethality.

In summary, the doctrinal requirements of AirLand Battle have forced upon us a method and tempo of battle which exceeds our experience to-date. At best, we can only replicate it as closely as possible in training of our units, especially at the National Training Center and, to a lesser degree, in home-station training. We must however, at least come to grips with what the AirLand Battle environment will be and what leadership implications it has for us.

CHAPTER III

LEADERSHIP IMPLICATIONS OF AIRLAND BATTLE FUTURE AND AIRLAND BATTLE 2000

The totality of technological advancement combined with the operational concepts of AirLand Battle and the operational methods of the opposing force provide a great deal of stress on the future battlefield. The handling of individual stress and, more importantly, stress among subordinate leaders and soldlers, will be a preeminent leader's task at all levels. A clear vision by the leader of the nature of the battlefield is required in order to cope with this stress.

Karl E. Weick provides a stress oriented vision of the future battlefield. 8 Future battles will be longer with slower replacement times and greater potential for feeling that the combat could go on and on. Objective danger will be higher because the size of the battlefield will be larger. It will be impossible to run away from battle because it will not be clear in which direction safety lies nor will the individual be able to avoid exposure while trying to locate the safe area.

Because of increased range and lethality of individual weapons systems, units will be smaller and will be dispersed over wider areas. These units will be connected by communications devices that are vulnerable to jamming. This will make it difficult for soldiers to get social support and an accurate view of what is happening.

People will wear uncomfortable masks, body armor, and protective clothing to reduce vulnerability to chemicals and radiation and they will be enclosed in mobile, armored vehicles for long periods

with minimal visual access to what is occurring around them. Fighting will be continuous, which means that people will be exposed at all times and therefore must be constantly vigilant. Since ammunition will inflict more severe bodily damage, injuries will be less survivable even if people can be evacuated.

The effect of these stresses upon individuals will have a profound effect on both individual and unit performance in battle. The education and preparation of our leaders to handle these stresses is thus a paramount concern. The operational environment has changed decidedly within the last several years and will change still further but at an accelerated rate. Our leader development concepts must also change with the times.

This notion is supported by S.D. Clement in his thoughts on leadership in the future. The requirements of AirLand Battle 2000 and Army 21 concepts result from changing environmental demands. To prepare tomorrow's leaders for such a battle with its focus on creativity and initiative, we must modify our leader development program which currently rewards conventional or safe behavior. Without guidance or vision, this modification could have dire consequences; inadequately trained leaders would clearly be an unacceptable risk. Avoiding this risk requires a clear vision of the future. 9

That vision must come from knowledgable and competent senior leaders who have studied AirLand Battle doctrine in depth and who can communicate that vision to subordinates and translate it into action.

CHAPTER IV

LEADERSHIP REQUIREMENTS FROM FM 22-103, DA PAM 600-80 AND FM 25-100

FM 22-103 (Leadership and Command at Senior Levels) provides the doctrinal basis for senior level leadership in peace and war and provides us an interface with AirLand Battle doctrine. In the FM, senior level leadership is defined as the art of direct and indirect influence and the skill of creating the conditions for sustained organizational success to achieve the desired result. Above all, senior level leadership is the art of taking a vision of what must be done, communicating it in a way that the intent is clearly understood and then being tough enough to insure its execution. 10

In answering the question: what must a senior leader do within his command in peacetime to insure that successful wartime leader—ship traits are trained and learned by his subordinates, a phased process is revealed. First, leadership at senior levels should draw no distinction between war and peace. Those who lead and command at senior levels must look beyond peace to establish a vision of what units and soldiers need for war, set the agenda and then train accordingly. FM 25-100 tells us that the commander's vision for his unit is further clarified when he links missions, tactical intent, goals and objectives to produce the battle focus for his unit. 11

Thus, successful leaders must attain and sustain the ability to look beyond the peacetime environment to what they anticipate war time conditions to be. For the well developed and experienced leader this should not be a difficult task. The difficulty lies in passing this vision on to younger, less well experienced subordinates.

Once the vision is captured, the elements of its composition must be addressed in the form of training objectives, developed in terms of task, condition and standards. Formulation and composition of these training objectives is vitally important. The objectives must encompass all of the predictable battle tasks, taking the form of a mission essential task list (METL). The objectives must also be carefully articulated to subordinate leaders to insure their full understanding of the what and the why of the task and in insuring their ownership of the task(s) within their sphere of operations. FM 22-103 reinforces this concept where it states: "There will be little time to learn new skills or to adapt once a conflict begins. The way those in senior positions approach the training of their unit will be the way units operate in war." 12

Execution, evaluation and follow-up of the training task(s) are the final steps by the senior leader in insuring that his subord-inate leaders are prepared in peacetime for their duties in wartime. This is however a multi-faceted responsibility of some complexity. The senior leader must create a suitable environment free of unnecessay administrative and artificial impediments to the training process. He must not only resource the required training event but zealously protect the training time allocted to his subunits. Additionally, the mirroring of wartime conditions in training is the goal. FM 25-100 reinforces this concept:

The probability of success in battle can be inferred from how closely the training events simulate the battlefield. The programs should introduce a high level of stress into the training... The anticipated level of combat stress demands more realistic and frequent simulations. Failure to do so will create soldiers and leaders inadequately prepared to fight and lead on the modern battlefield. 13

The senior leader's role in this process must be carefully executed to Insure that he does not become part of the problem. FM 22-103 tells us: "The involvement of senior leaders in the administrative and training battlefield will determine the manner of their presence on the combat battlefield." 14 This statement is both a goal and a warning. The micro-managing brigade commander who establishes a monthly reenlistment "show and tell" with each of his fifteen of sixteen company commanders is imposing a dependency structure on his subordinates which may not exist in wartime. The division commander who allows the imposition of overly restrictive safety measures during platoon gunnery tables subverts the trust and confidence of subordinate leaders and the skills of their soldiers and will not establish the realistic conditions described above.

The key to success in this final phase, as FM 22-103 states, is practicing and developing leadership and command habits in peace that will be used in war. The current command and leadership environment must be reviewed to determine existing elements of that environment we retain, which do we change, and what do we discard in the interests of an improved environment. That analysis is provided below. But first I will review, from an historical perspective, how successful senior leaders of the past dealt with creating their wartime leadership environments.

CHAPTER V

HISTORICAL SURVEY OF PAST LEADERS

Having identified the doctrinal requirements for Airland Battle and discussed the leadership implications and requirements of the

doctrine, I will now turn to an historical examination of past leaders to see how they treated, from a leadership perspective, the emerging and existing doctrinal dilemmas of their time.

THOMAS J. "STONEWALL" JACKSON

"Stonewall" Jackson has long been recognized as one of this country's great captains and as an exceptional leader who maximized the effectiveness of his troops in gaining victories on the battle-field. It was the conditions under which his forces fought and won that is of most interest to us here. Most notably, during the valley campaign of 1862, with a force of less than 17,000 troops, Jackson out-marched and out-fought numerically superior Federal forces in a series of engagements. The actual and perceived threat of his actions during this campaign succeded in holding in position the 40,000 Union troops of McDowell's Corps near Fredericksburg thus preventing their reinforcement of McClellan's Army of the Potomac which was then threatening Richmond.

Douglas Southall Freeman attributes Jackson's success to three superior qualities of his command and leadership. 15 The first of these was Jackson's quick and sure sense of position and use of terrain. In an era when positional warfare was a major determinant of success, Jackson proved to be a master. Secondly, Jackson demonstrated a keen strategic sense, the components of which were secrecy, superiority of force and sound logistics. These components made possible the third superior quality, the employment of initiative in a way which deprived his opponent of any alternatives to react against him.

Personal leadership of and responsibility for his soldiers was

another Jackson trademark. It was this measure of his leadership that enabled him to demand and receive from his men their utmost effort in marching and in fighting. According to James I. Robertson Jr., Jackson considered the welfare of the lowest private in the most obscure company his own responsibility. Jackson had a mania for enforcement of regulations and procedures. Inefficient officers felt his scrutiny for in Jackson's mind inadequate command promoted loose discipline which in turn would eventually destroy an army. 16 Yet, Jackson was loved and revered by his men. Moreover, he became a legend in the North as well as in the South even before his death at Chancellorsville in 1863. In the words of Robertson:

Because Jackson understood the personal privations of his men and lived so much like them in the field, his soldiers developed increasing affection for the general. Yet they loved him in an odd sort of way. They feared his anger, they sweated under his iron discipline, and at times they openly cursed him for demanding more than they thought they could give. But at the same time, they held him in awe... The only thing the men got was victory after victory. That was enough.

WILLIAM T. SHERMAN

Also from the civil war era, General William T. Sherman is an important historical study in leadership in that he introduced to North America a new method of waging war. The study of his campaign in Georgia and the Carolinas in 1864 and 1865 provides us an early glimpse of total war concepts which followed in the Twentieth century. John G. Barrett provides us insights into Sherman's thinking. Concluding that it was impossible to change the hearts of the people in the South, and considering all of the people of the South as enemies of the Union, Sherman planned to use his military forces against the civilian population as well as the armies of the enemy.

In bringing the war to the homefront, Sherman hoped to destroy the South's will to fight. 18 The reconciling of the ethical delimmas inherent in this bold and often brutal concept showed Sherman to be a man of conscience as well as of vision.

In the execution of the campaign, Sherman the leader, showed a high level of initiative and willingness to accept risks in his violation of current military conventions and wisdom by severing his lines of supply and reinforcement and striking deep into enemy territory. He showed self-confidence and aggressiveness in thought as well as in action as he relentlessly pressed forward into the South.

MG TERRY ALLEN

Two divisional commanders of the Second World War gained acclaim for the methods which they had established in their respective organizations. Both of these divisions enjoyed a high reputation for success in combat.

The first of these leaders is MG Terry Allen of the 1st and later the 104th Infantry Divisions. A key to Terry Allen's leader—ship was his identification with his troops. He was an outstanding tactician who mastered the use of night attacks. He appeared to have an uncanny ability to anticipate his opponents and beat them to the punch. In this sense he was master of his trade. His ability to project his character and his personality through—out all echelons of his command, influenced men of the First Division to mirror his spirit and regard him as a great commander. He was a good communicator and role model. His personal characteristics and his manner of operation had natural appeal to his officers and men. His magnetic personality was one of contrasts. He was warm, friendly,

sympathetic, and sincere. Above all he was constantly concerned for the welfare of his men. On the other hand, he was daring, aggressive, and highly competitive.

General Allen did not concern himself with details, placing maximum responsibility on his staff and commanders to work them out. This trust in his subordinates was more than paid for by their fine performance and their willingness and determination to accomplish any task rather than let him down. 19

General Allen took command of the 1st Division shortly before its movement overseas. Adequate time was not available to devote to such things as rifle marksmanship, maintainance, and other functional subjects. When this "Green" division landed in North Africa, it had no previous combat experience to bolster its confidence. What it had, was a tremendous fighting spirit to compensate for the lack of training and experience. This magnificent spirit, supplied by Terry Allen's personal leadership, increased with each campaign. 20 The 1st Division was successful because Terry Allen compensated for its initial lack of experience by establishing purpose, providing direction, and generating motivation.

General Allen met most of the prerequisites which we demand of senior leaders and he predictably would do well on the Airland Battlefield. However, there was a flaw in his character which would ultimately be his downfall during his command of the Big Red One. Allen operated in a relaxed manner which is not necessarily a bad attribute. He was not however, a strict disciplinarian. Procedures or policies which he felt did not contribute to the esprit de corps of the Big Red One were not stressed and discipline suffered as a

result. He was guilty of circumventing the stated values and culture articulated by his seniors and his operating values were not what was expected of him or his unit. A sense of hubris ruled his decision making in this regard and finally made him expendable to his seniors. In the words of General Bradley:

Among the division commanders in Tunisia, none excelled the unpredictable Terry Allen in the leadership of his troops. He had made himself the champion of the 1st Infantry Division G.I. and they in turn championed him. But in looking out for his own division, Allen tended to belittle the roles of the others and demand for his Big Red. One prerogatives we could not fairly accord it. 21

MG JACK WOOD

The 4th Armored Division was one of the most renowned U.S. armored divisions of the Second World War. The Division Commander was MG John S. Wood, a onetime field artillery officer who had entered the young armored force in 1941 as an artillery commander. He graduated from West Point in 1912 and took part in operations during the First World War at Chateau Thierry and St. Mihiel as a division staff officer. 22

As with General Allen, General Wood established an excellent reputation for himself and for the division he commanded. For Wood however, the situation was somewhat different in that he established that reputation within a doctrine and style of warfare which was relatively new to the U.S. Army. His success as a senior leader has been acknowledged by many sources. Nat Frankel, a member of the 4th Armored Division had this to say about Wood:

It is equally important to point out that Wood was not merely a master tactician but an innovative one as well. The importance of the 4th derives a great deal from the way in which we epitomized the classical armored unit... It was Wood who made

the oral command common, encouraged the quick order, and cultivated all officers he felt were capable of making speedy decisions. He added to this a fetish for constant aerial cover and a fanatical insistence on continuous movement. These developments defined the armored division. As such, he was not merely the father of the 4th Armored but the father of the very concept they embodied. 23

Wood considered himself to be an expert on employment of his armored force. The noted British military historian B.H. Liddell Hart, reasons that the Allied high command threw away their best chance of exploiting the breakout at Avranches by sticking to the outdated pre-invasion program in which a westward movement to capture Brittany ports was the next step. He states the following about Wood: "I spent two days with him shortly before the invasion (Normandy) and he had impressed me as being more conscious of the possibilities of a deep exploitation and the importance of speed than anyone else. Telling me later what happened at the breakout, Wood said that there was no conception of far-reaching directions for armor in the minds of our top people, nor of supplying such thrusts. 24

This somewhat superior attitude reflected the confusion of the times as well as the differences of opinion which exsisted as the 12th Army Group sought to breakout from the Normandy beachhead. The official Army history records the following:

The commanders who were to lead the spearheads into Brittany regarded themselves as belonging to the Patton school of thought. They seized upon the situation of exploitation with relish. Generals Wood and Grow in particular felt affinity toward General Patton who like them, was a tank officer...Having led the U.S. Forces from the breakthrough into the breakout, they and their units became infected with an enthusiasm and a selfconfidence that were perfectly suited to exploitation but proved to be a headache to those who sought to retain a semblance of control. A naturally headstrong crew became rambunctious in Brittany. 25

Wood's headstrong attitude was perhaps a reflection of his initiative and determination. It is also indicative of the problems encountered during the breakout as reflected in the following passage. Note the corollary to what we expect to be the environment of the Airland Battle. During the breakout into Brittany, the commanders of the 4th and 6th Armored Divisions found that they had outrun communications with VII Corps Headquarters. Needing to react quickly to the fast-changing situations, they could not wait for orders which might be out dated by the time they arrived. As General Wood later recalls:

The situation at the time was extremely fluid. I had to make decisions on my own responsibility, since there were no orders from higher authority. Of course everything went according to plan, but at that time no one in higher circles had yet discovered just how the plan fitted the events. We could not wait for directions or objectives to be passed down from higher authority. 26

In spite of his success as a division commander, General Wood proved to be more than his superiors could tolerate. Like General Allen, Wood was ultimately relieved of command. General Wood was returned to the United States in December 1944 and would not return to the Europeon theater. According to General Patton: "In a rapid moving advance, he is the greatest Division Commander I have ever seen, but when things get sticky he is inclined to worry too much, which keeps him from sleeping and wears him down, and makes it difficult to control his operations. "However tired he had grown, Wood was so evidently one of the best of the Division Commandersperhaps the best—that suspicion of his superiors' motives has inevitably gathered around the question of relief. Perhaps he had expressed his differences of opinion with the high command too

forthrightly... 27 Yet Wood was very much respected, even revered by his men. Again in the words of Nat Frankel:

The key to understanding and appreciating John Wood is the word balance. I have said that he was capable of being both dog soldier and master planner; he saw things from both the basement and from Olympus. It was natural, never forced or contrived, for him to live with and like the men. After all, the leader and the led had fused and that's no mere figure of speech! He sloshed in the mud, slept outside and took the same rude baths we took. 28

In summary, the gifts of a superb military leader were united in Jackson: imagination, boldness, determination, and speed in maneuver. Apart from dealing with the ethical dilemmas of total war, Sherman also demonstrated initiative and willingness to accept risks during his campaign through Georgia by severing his lines of communications. These attributes and attitudes would certainly apply today on the AirLand battlefield.

Generals Allen and Wood both exemplified in their time the tenets and operational imperatives of what we know today as AirLand Battle. They were aggressive and possessed high levels of initiative. They were attuned to the welfare of their men and sought to eliminate or at least reduce their discomfort and maintain morale in as high a state as possible. Both were masterful tacticians; they knew their business. Yet, each had a flaw in his character which led to his downfall. How can we embody the leadership requirements of the AirLand battlefield while avoiding the mistakes of Generals Allen and Wood? How can we do the same for our subordinates?

CHAPTER VI

WHAT MUST WE SUSTAIN, IMPROVE, ADD OR DELETE FROM CURRENT AND FUTURE LEADERSHIP METHODS?

Having established a frame of reference on successful leadership from a historical perspective, it is now time to turn to the
realities of the situation which we find today. According to
Lieutenant General (Ret.) Walter F. Ulmer Jr., the essentials of
good leadership have changed little over the ages. "Good leadership
still does great things... However, poor leadership today is much
less tolerable - much more dysfunctional - than it was thirty years
ago. Units today are more complex than they were twenty years ago.
Both machines, doctrine and groups of people are more complicated".

What must we sustain, improve, add or delete from current and future leadership methods to improve our success in the execution of AirLand Battle doctrine? First is a change in attitude and mindset. All leaders, from the most senior in an organization, through all subordinate leaders, must share a conceptual vision of the environment in which they will be called upon to do battle. This shared vision must be replicated as closely as possible, and as much as resources allow, within the training of the organization and its subunits. Mission type orders and execution within the well defined intent of the commander must be the rule rather than the exception. This concept must carry over into the day to day activities of the organization whether those activities involve training, administration, maintenance, etc. Some units are very capable at operating in the decentralized mode required, while others have rarely had the

opportunity. We can improve in this area as noted by T. Owen Jacobs:

The requirement for conceptualizing the battlefield has been pushed down several echelons by the complexity of the battlefield and by the fact that direct and positive control of subordinate elements may not be possible because of electronic interferences with communications. Junior leaders who in present conditions would be directly controlled by their senior, must in the future assess their own situations and determine their own required next actions. In order to understand the flow of battle and make correct decisions, they must have a frame of reference which allows them to understand the intentions of their senior commanders... This represents a major change for junior leaders from current operational practice and training. 30

The confident senior leader who has clearly articulated his vision for the grooming and training of the organization ought to be able to locsen the reins and allow his subordinates to get on with accomplishing the mission. The senior leader who holds monthly reenlistment inprocess reviews with his company commanders is demonstrating his lack of trust and confidence in those leaders, robbing them of time which they need to spend with their soldiers and escalating the wrong event as a priority of his concern.

We must not create artificial dependencies of the junior leader on the senior leader to accomplish his duties. If these impediments are not removed, we will never get to the point where those junior leaders are truly prepared for their participation in AirLand Battle. We must improve their ability to conceptualize based on the commander's stated intent. We must enable them to make sound decisions on the myriad of questions which arise day to day without having to have the express permission of "the old man". They must be able to operate within the parameters of a clear vision and intent of their senior, supplemented by whatever specific guidance

is deemed necessary in any particular area.

The goal then is to eliminate those instances which seem to require overly direct and positive controls of subordinates. We must stress and provide for our subordinates' freedom of action to act or react within our stated intent for things to happen. Again, in the words of T. Owen Jacobs:

The suggestion is that different decision processes will be required. Current Army culture tends to produce leaders at junior levels who are more reactive than proactive (adaptors rather than innovators) and whose time horizons are quite short. This culture also tends to produce conservative mid-level commanders (company thru brigade) by virtue of an evaluation system which makes command errors extremely costly in terms of career potential, Thus, while Army commanders as a population are essentially the cream of the crop, Army culture is risk-adversive, conservative, and reactive. It seems highly likely that these characteristics will not be adaptive on the future battlefield. 31

Yet, the way in which we manage our junior leaders, makes it difficult to steer away from the risk-adversive, conservative, and reactive mold. For those who desire a career in the profession of arms, the pathway to success is frought with many minefields where one false step, or act, could eliminate him from continued active service. The most recent promotion board to Captain is an example. The calendar year 1988 selection board for promotion to Captain considered 2,068 first lieutenants for promotion. The officers selected from the first time considered category averaged 2.5 years of active federal commissioned service and just over 1.2 years in grade at the time the board adjourned. When the length of various basic branch courses and any follow-on specialty training is factored out, the average officer in this situation will have less than

two years in a unit or at an installation in which to perform his initial leadership duties prior to facing the promotion board.

The board is charged with selecting the best qualified officers for promotion with selection based on the board's determination of the potential of an officer for continued outstanding service to the Army. The determination of that potential, the board is told, must be based for the most part, on the performance of duty in his or her career field reflected in the official record before the board.

Although the factors of military bearing, and physical fitness, military and civilian education, and professional training are considered by the board for each eligible officer, the key element in their deliberations will be the records of performance as indicated on the officer's efficiency report. The average first lieutenant, given the limited amount of time he has been in a unit since commissioning will have few reports in his file; perhaps only one or two. In a few cases, where there has been rapid personnel turnover, there may be three or four reports.

Any mistake in performance or judgement of the rated officer annotated on any one of these few reports will be glaringly apparent to the selection board members. Any comments noted of a negative nature will be utilized by board members as reason for not selecting an individual. In fact, it may be at this level that boards are looking for discriminators to not select an officer rather than searching for high performance indicators of those personnel who deserve selection, a sort of nonselection as opposed to selection process.

The 1988 selection board selected 1,737 of 2,068 first time considered officers for promotion. a selection rate of 83.9 percent. The selection rate within the combat arms branches hovered around 80 percent. The perceptive young officer, as most of them are, knows he or she does not have much time to lose in establishing an exemplary record of performance and that any detrimental comments on that performance could place them among the 20 percent not selected for promotion. Unless the junior leader enjoys an open and continual performance counselling communication with rater and senior rater, he or she may choose to adopt a risk-adversive, don't take chances leadership style which stifles initiative and sets them into a reactive rather than a proactive mode - the antithesis of what we are looking for in an AirLand Battle leader.

Add to this the "threat" of the CVI process and rebranching board actions, where for example, 51 percent of 298 year group 1986 infantry officers were rebranced into combat support and service support branches, we have the cultural malaise spoken of by Jacobs.

How can we correct this phenomena? How can we protect against it? It is unlikely that current our future changes in personnel policies will allow a longer period of junior officer development before the weeding out process begins and we place junior leaders in a do or die situation. Moreover, Congressional mandates to reduce and then maintain the commissioned officer corps at smaller levels will at least maintain if not exacerbate the present condition.

The only forseeable solution is to institutionalize leader development with the rater-senior rater team nurturing, coaching, and

training their charges to meet the standards of leadership required on the AirLand battlefield. We must eliminate the risk-adversive environment, accept, within reason, occassional mistakes and errors in judgement and loosen the reins to promote the exercise of initiative and flexibility and to assist in the development of character.

Execution of this obligation to the depth required is time consuming, particularly for the senior rater, but the pay-off is high. The current officer evaluation system (DA Form 67-8) which includes the senior rater profile on rated officer potential also compounds the problem in one respect. According to the 1989 Senior Rater Update published by PERSCOM: "The very simple (but not easy) question asked of senior raters is: who are your best officers? That's what selection boards want to know." In a sense then, the senior rater profile is viewed by some, if not most commissioned officers, as an informal order of merit list. This is certainly true of the rated officer. Those senior raters who take the time to review his portion of the report with the rated officer will note that the individual's placement on the profile chart receives the closest and usually immediate scrutiny. Those officers who feel free to talk about their report with their peers normally refer first, if not exclusively, to their placement on "the old man's" profile.

Although the senior rater profile can provide meaningful decision making information to a selection board, it can also become the root cause of failure or inability of the senior leader to initiate the positive, non-threatening command environment we need to

develop leaders for AirLand Battle. In order to remove the stigma of the senior rater profile as an unofficial OML, the senior rater must spend a significant amount of time in explaining to his ratee population his philosophy on the rating system and the construction of his senior rater's profile. He must get out among his leaders to observe them first hand. He must devote time to pre-report periodic counselling and then to debriefing once the report is rendered. The bottom line here is that the ratee must have trust and confidence in his senior rater. If this expectation is not fulfilled then a risk-adversive, limited initiative, environment will continue.

Nonetheless, we must create the situation where the results of selection boards are an affirmation of the leader development process conducted by the rater and senior rater. They must have the wisdom and courage to recognize the marginal or ineffective leader and take steps to insure that a leader does not advance beyond his level of competence at the expense of other, more capable leaders.

One of the recent innovations introduced in the 1980's which must be retained for development of the Airland Battle leader is the National Training Center. The greatest value of the NTC as a training site is its ability to identify problems in unit leadership and training. 32 Among the leadership problems continually witnessed by Observer- Controllers (OC's) at the NTC are: failure to plan in adequate detail, failure to make best use of available time; lack of understanding of the intent of the commander; lack of delegation of tasks and authority to subordinate leaders; failure of leaders to supervise after an order is given; failure to communicate and en-

force standards; and lack of decisiveness by leaders. All of these shortcomings are key factors when success or failure on the AirLand Battlefleld is considered.

The NTC is one of the peacetime fixes required for success in wartime. Yet the identification and correction of these problems cannot be associated soley with the NTC. These leadership and training problems are systemic in nature and are problems which must be addressed prior to and following NTC rotations. While the Army's senior leadership can establish policies which impact on systemic solutions, as the Chief of Staff of the Army did in his leadership white Paper of 1985, these problems require action by leaders at all levels in the Army. Changes in the manner in which units conduct training at home station and conduct leader development programs can be implemented by corps, division, and brigade commanders. 33

The strides taken in translating doctrine into Army training are laudable. Fort Irwin's NTC gives battalion units an opportunity to engage in well constructed simulated battle. However, there are additional steps that should be taken. Training to encourage individual and platoon level initiative is honored more in the breach than in actual practise. If a sense of maneuver is to be cultivated, it will depend on quick decisions and an active force. Those conditions must accompany training at the individual and small unit level. 34

What are the changes required to improve home station training and leader development? The answer lies in an effective training management system the purpose of which is to manage training time, facilities and other resources while minimizing training detractors. Various types of training management systems are in use throughout the Army. No matter the system used, the key is in maximizing the

positive contributions of these systems for the purpose of training management. Moreover, the management system must parallel the senior leaders vision of what kind of training should be conducted in his subunits while at the same time providing the required support for that training.

A common weakness in training management is the last minute insertion of training events which are neither planned nor resourced. The biggest problem with these types of events is the disruption they cause at the company and battalion level. Most often, these events are top-driven affairs, executed outside of the prepare for war focus of the unit. Because these are top-driven events, it is up to the senior leader to control, at best to limit, these normally short fuzed requirements.

FM 25-100 provides us a training management tool, seen below in Figure 1, which can be equated to the area of operations when discussing tactics. 35 The period of influence is that time period in which each commander is best able to impact subordinates' training without causing undue turbulence. The period of interest is an expanded period in which the commander must make decisions concerning resources and events that will effect training conducted during his period of interest. While the biennial rotation of commanders from battalion through corps level may obviate the need to address a period of interest, the periods of influence must be zealously protected by the leaders at each level.

TRAINING INFLUENCE AND INTEREST

ECHELON	PERIOD OF INFLUENCE	PERIOD OF INTEREST
CORPS	2 - 5 YEARS	6 - 7 YEARS
DIVISION	1 - 2 YEARS	3 - 5 YEARS
BRIGADE	6 - 12 MONTHS	1 - 3 YEARS
BATTALION	2 - 6 MONTHS	6 - 18 MONTHS
COMPANY	3 - 6 WEEKS	7 - 20 WEEKS

FIGURE 1

The senior leader's role in development and training of subordinate leaders for Airland Battle is a dominant one, dominant to
the extent that any failure to sufficiently develop Airland Battle
leaders at the tactical and operational level might very well be
laid at the feet of senior leaders. The successful senior leader
must, by virtue of his position and his unique responsibilities,
leave behind the direct leadership role with which he has been most
comfortable and assume the intrinsically more difficult role of
indirect leadership. The senior leader must remember that he no
longer commands companies or battalions. He has subordinate leaders
who will assume those duties and no matter how comfortable he might
be in doing their duties for them, he must take stock of his senior
position and fulfill those duties which that position call for. DA
Pam 600-80 describes the senior leaders duties as follows:

As leaders progress from direct to organizational to executive ranks, they leave behind direct leadership to subordinates. They focus instead on creating conditions to assist and enhance direct leadership. [Senior] leaders are responsible for the most important of the conditions that influence how well direct leaders can lead - the organization's culture and values. 36

As can be see, the senior leader becomes a standard bearer as he carries out the process of developing subordinate leaders. He must establish and then represent the culture and values of the Army and of the organization which he heads. DA Pam 600-80 tells us Army culture is the body of beliefs members have about the organization and what it stands for, and their expectations of one another as members. Values are statements of what is important. Stated values are determined by the executive or senior leadership. As these values are translated by the intervening echelons of leadership, they provide policy guidance and operating procedures for the organization as a whole. Operating values are individual perceptions, from within the ranks, of what actually is important.

The relationship of culture, values, and operating procedures is shown in Figure 2. 37 The effective senior leader must work to insure that his custodianship as standard bearer for the organization's culture and his announced values are not tarnished. He must insure that his stated values and the organization's operating values are synonymous, otherwise he may be seen by his subordinates as duplicious and untrustworthy. He must insure that the translation of his stated values into operating rules and procedures by subordinate leaders is consistent with his intent.

CULTURE




Figure 2

A key element within the scope of stated and organizational values is the amount of control which the senior leader imposes on his organization and the degree of decision making latitude which he permits his subordinate leaders. Often times we see in our units a stated value which embraces decentralized execution and maximum latitude for subordinate leaders to lead, while in reality, the operational value is one of over centralization and tight control.

This is a complex problem with which the senior leader must deal. Control and decision making latitude are in fact reciprocals. As shown in Figure 3, the more control there is, the less decision latitude there can be. The more control there is, the more slowly thinking and decision skills will mature throughout the organiza-

tion. Taking it a step further, a highly controlled organization creates a tendency for subordinate leaders to be reactive rather than proactive, to await orders for initiation of appropriate action. Additionally, a highly controlled organization tends to create a mindset toward reliance on others for solutions to problems, rather than self-reliance and initiative - the dependency syndrome upon which I commented earlier.

EFFECTS OF HIGH LEVEL OF CONTROL

MORE

LESS

Predictability
Immediate Performance
Capacity for quick reaction
Tendency to wait for orders

Uncertainty
Long-term individual growth
Capacity to plan future action
Tendency to diagnose situation
and react

Figure 3 (38)

The condition of the tightly controlled organization is the antihesis of what we would hope to be the operational environment within our AirLand Battle units. The senior leader must strike a balance between a tightly controlled organization and one which allows latitude in subordinate decision making and initiative building. Ideally, the scales would be tipped in favor of the latter. The senior leader's ability or willingness to strike that balance will be dependent upon several factors. How does he view his own operational environment with his seniors? If it is also tightly controlled and threatening, then he will in all probability be risk adversive and structure his units to maximize predictability and immediate performance. If he does feel free to decent-

ralize control but has not made the stated value of decentralization synonymous with the operational value as seen by his subordinates, then they will not react accordingly. If he has not accepted responsibility for or taken the time as a leader to coach, train, and nurture his subordinate leaders and insure that similar programs are operative in his sub-units, then the entire echelon of sub-ordinate leaders will be ill-equipped to accept the challenges of decentralization and initiative building.

The stakes are high in the role which the senior leader must play in the development of his subordinate leaders for Airland Battle. David Segal discusses those stakes in this way:

In combat, the potential cost to the individual subordinate is high. He is not likely to be indifferent to the outcome, and unless a relationship based upon effect and expertise has been developed prior to engaging in combat, it is likely that the battlefield will be characterized by constant negotiation and calculation rather than by smooth military operations. 39

CHAPTER VII

WHICH LEADERSHIP SKILLS ARE CRUCIAL?

What are the Airland Battle skills which the senior leader should seek to develop in his subordinate leaders? I have already identified initiative as a key skill. Levels of initiative in junior leaders varies from individual to individual and from unit to unit, depending in large measure upon the command climate in which the individual finds himself, and whether he feels secure in exercising it.

In another sense, the level of initiative displayed by any given leader is also governed by his own level of personal confid-

ence, or lack of it. Confidence can only be gained by exposure to those situations which tax one's decision making and physical abilities. It is not as if initiative was characteristically lacking in American soldiers. In the words of Herbert London:

In a sense rarely considered, the American penchant for individualism is an advantageous factor in training for AirLand Battle and, more importantly, in a military theater where action at the platoon level and mobility are requisites for success. In combat that requires quick reaction time, Americans might use their traditional prediliction for individual initiative to compensate for superior Soviet firepower. 40

Closely linked to initiative is the capacity to operate autonomously and with greater flexibility and adapability. 41

As described above, autonomous operations by Junior leaders will be a norm during Airland Battle. Not only must the Junior leader be permitted to do so, but he must also be equipped to do so. His personal stature among his soldiers and the degree of vertical and horizontal cohesion within the unit will determine in large measure the willingness of his soldiers to follow him. This will be of particular importance in the instance where they know that their continued combat will be guided only by their immediate leader, operating autonomously, separated from their senior leadership.

These skills are closely linked to the issue of "powering down", that is, empowering our subordinate leaders to act or react as they know they should and as we would want them to. Application of this principle in peacetime is essential to success in war. Additionally, powering down in peacetime can give added impetus to organizational excellence. Norman Grunstad describes it this way:

There is only so much energy available in an organization. The more of that energy used just to maintain the organization, the less there is available to be innovative and creative. When power is held at the top, the rest of the organization has to use its limited resources of time and energy to feed the insatiable appetite of the power holders; thus there is no time and energy left at the lower levels to do what subordinates know already should be done. 42

Greater flexibility and adaptability on the part of junior leaders and their units will be required. As in past eras, the AirLand battlefield will almost certainly bring surprises. However, surprises and changes to the operation plan will occur more quickly than in the past. Our own increased mobility and that of the enemy, will promote more battlefield fluidity. Leaders must have the ability to recognize when changes or unplanned events are about to occur and then move or adapt quickly to counter such changes. It is vitally important that the senior leader teach his subordinates how to think through situations rather than teaching them what to think about specific situations or problems.

Jacobs also suggests that preparation of AirLand Battle Junior leaders must provide them the capacity and opportunity to experiment with unfamiliar situations in training, to learn from their mistakes, and overlearn the process of thinking through situations and problems to ensure that the intitial shock of combat stress will not cause cognitive freezing. Of equal concern to Jacobs is creation of a climate that permits rational risk taking. This must be a climate in which training and development of subordinate leaders is viewed as a top priority, and coaching and mentoring on the part of the senior leader is viewed as both a method of choice and a required

leader skill. 43 Brigadier General Wayne A. Downing reinforces this concept:

One of the first things we must do is learn to accept mistakes and set up a system which provides those junior leaders who will control our destiny with the quality, nonthreatening feedback they need to learn the art of maneuver based operations. 44

CHAPTER VIII

WHAT MUST THE SENIOR LEADER DO?

How does the senior leader inculcate these leadership traits and skills in subordinate leaders? First the senior leader must establish the appropriate command climate and leadership environment. As mentioned above he must insure that his stated values are synonymous with the operational values of the organization as seen by his subordinates. As stated in FM 25-100, A positive command environment exists when a climate of trust and confidence is shared by competent leaders. Once this environment is established, the freedom to learn is evident. 45

With the appropriate environment established, inculcation of the desired skills then becomes a matter of indoctrination and training. This is done at a higher level, external to the organization through doctrine and at a lower level, within the organization, by the senior leader deciding which skills he feels are most important given the nature of his people, equipment, and mission. The senior leader must then serve as the standard bearer of those skills, representing the embodiment of what he wants his subordinate leaders to be.

The senior leader must be careful in his selection of desired skills. He must not depart from established doctrinal methods yet he must include all of the predictive battle tasks required in combat. TRADOC's doctrinal system of STRAC manuals, mission training plans, battle drills and Soldier's Manuals are all published to provide doctrinal standardization in the skills to be trained. The senior leader must not create non-standard tasks which are situationally unique, unfamiliar to unit personnel, and not a part of his battle focus. The essential benefits of using standardized training tasks include establishing consistency across units, making maximum use of available training time and building confidence in soldiers and units.

Standardization is also important in other aspects of preparing subordinate leaders for AirLand Battle. The senior leader must capitalize on the positive attributes of establishing common procedures and operating methods within his command. Tactical SOPs at all levels, vehicle load plans and common, standardized procedures for all logistical functions are all included in this broad standardization category.

Common standardized procedures and operational methods permit commanders and units to adjust rapidly to changing tactical situations. They enable leaders and soldiers to function in combat when actions must be automatic and eliminate the need for retraining when units are cross-attached. Additionally, they foster flexibility in battle by reducing the need for complex orders. 46

Although standardization in this area occurs in most units, experience shows that units suffer from a lack of uniform enforcement of those standardized procedures which are implemented. The senior leader must perform as an enforcer in this regard and insist that his subordinate leaders also guarantee adherence to prescribed operational methods.

Not all subordinate leaders will be able to either grasp or exhibit the desired skills without training. FM 25-100 (Training the Force) provides the doctrinal leader training sequence and structure to be followed. 47 A sequential seminar, TEWT, train, evaluate, retrain, sequence is essential and can be easily integrated into officer and noncommissioned officer professional development programs and into multiechelonment of collective training periods. Additionally, if a decentralized environment has truly been established within the organization, with individual and crew training periods conducted under the supervision of the NCO's, the commissioned officers will be afforded additional time for leader training and professional growth.

Leaders should be assembled by peer group, for leader development training under tutelage of their appropriate mentor. Following the example in FM 25-100, commanders should focus their attention two echelons down. 48 All of the company commanders in a brigade for example would receive leader development training from the brigade commander, with battalion commanders assisting. Seminars, TEWTS, and terrain walks would form the core of the instruction. This arrangement should be mirrored at all levels; divisional com-

manders training battalion commanders; battalion commanders training lieutenants; battalion command sergeants major training platoon sergeants. This involvement and interest ensures that leaders are performing their responsibilities to train and evaluate their subordinates. Furthermore this involvement improves mutual understanding of senior and junior leaders concepts for conducting tactical missions.

The senior leader must resource and provide time for this training, eliminating any systemic barriers to its execution. What effect will cuts in operations and maintenance dollars and operation tempo (OPTEMPO) have on a leader development program? Will cuts in OPTEMPO cause a decline in the momentum of a successful leader development? The answer ought to be no. Any properly constructed leader development program ought to have sufficient priority to remain above the line in any decrement of unit activity due to cuts in OPTEMPO. Additionally, a program which embodies seminars, TEWTS, and terrain walks as the operatative methods of skill development will certainly be less costly in terms of resources than an FTX or CALFEX. Moreover, time and energy gained through cuts in collective training events due to OPTEMPO cuts, ought to be applied to the leader development program.

Once the content of the training programs have been determined and the training events resourced, the senior leader must become his own training inspector. The rostering of brigade and division staff officers to go out and inspect subordinate unit training in the name of the S-3/G-3 or the commander, must come to an end. The commander,

the senior leader, must view first hand the training in progress and lend his knowledge, expertise and advice in the process. This will not be easy to do when one considers the normal daily routine of the typical senior leader who is confined to his headquarters (or his superior's) involved in a litany of administrative minutia which by rights ought to fall to the staff officer.

The foregoing represents the formal aspects of the senior leader's role in the preparation of his subordinate leaders for AirLand Battle. There is also an informal role which the senior leader should exercise by virtue of his position as mentor and role model. In former years a senior leader exercised a great amount of direct influence on subordinates and sought to imbue them with more thorough professional development and thinking apart from the traditional and formal military education then available.

Captain George B. McClellan, later to be commander of the Army of the Potomac during the Civil War, enjoyed an unofficial "post-graduate course" in the art of war conducted by Dennis Hart Mahan. Mahan's Napoleon Club was open to the faculty and other officers stationed at West Point. They met regularly to hear and discuss papers on Bonaparte's campaigns. 49 In this manner McClellan and his contemporaries were able to expand their professional deviopment in a manner which was fairly common in the Army during middle and late 1800's.

The master-pupil association between Major Dwight Eisenhower and General Fox Conner is another excellent example of a senior leader assisting in the personal development of a subordinate. For

nearly three years in Panama, the young Eisenhower pursued his education in military history, an interest awakened by Conner. Under Conner's tutelage, Eisenhower proceeded from military history to memoirs to military doctrine to philosophy. Conner would cross-examine him on his readings, on every command decsion: why it had been made, what had been the alternatives, what might have happened under different circumstances. Eisenhower later said that: "life with Conner was a sort of graduate school in military affairs and the humanities, leavened by the comments and discourses of a man who was experienced in his knowledge of men and their conduct." 50

The informal education of leaders like McClellan and Elsenhower by their superiors seems to have become something of a lost art in the modern era. The want of time, the press of duty and social obligations, the change in life styles, all seem to have taken away a valuable means for the senior leader to influence the further professional development of his subordinates. Yet, it is exactly this type of mentoring and leadership that we must return to if the senior leader - subordinate leader (master - pupil) relationship is to improve.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Although FM 100-5 provides us the basic tenets and operational imperatives for preparation and conduct of AirLand Battle, what is most important is an understanding by the leader, of the battlefield environment in which he will lead. Increased lethality, fluidity and movement will require from our leaders faster reaction to actions of the enemy, far better anticipation of those enemy actions and far more accurate readings of the flow of battle. These requirements must be met by in-depth study of opposing force tactics, detailed knowledge of our own unit capabilities and weapons effects, improved ability to "read" the terrain, and virtually reflexive action in generation of combat power and initiative to defeat the enemy.

Development of these skills is already addressed, to varying degrees, in institutional and unit training programs. We must, however, intensify the degree of effort and depth of learning. Programs of instruction in the various branch and staff courses should be amended to initiate this intensification of effort. It is most necessary however, that we further increase each leaders exposure to "hands-on" application of these skills in unit training and professional development programs. Additionally, we must replicate the AirLand battlefield environment as closely as possible in individual and unit training and continue to maximize use of established training programs and systems such as the National Training Center.

The key to successfully preparing our subordinate leaders for the AirLand battlefield rests with the senior leadership - brigade, division and corps commanders. The prescriptive methodology by which they accomplish this vital task already exists within Field Manuals 22-103, 25-100 and DA PAM 600-80. The process by which they accomplish the task is however, where we need further improvement.

If they are to be successful in this task, senior leaders must attain and sustain the ability to look beyond the peacetime environment to what they anticipate the wartime conditions for their units to be. Once they have formed this vision, they must address the predicted battlefield tasks in the form of tasks, conditions and standards by which training will be conducted. Execution, evaluation and follow-up round out the required process. It is incumbent upon the senior leader to create a suitable environment in which the training will be conducted. Unnecessary administrative and artificial impediments to the training process must be eliminated. Training events must be properly resourced and time for the subunits to conduct the training must be zealously protected.

Moreover, the senior leader must review his personal role in the environment to insure that he is not or does not become part of the problem. The press of frequent administrative, non-combat related tasks and requirements is heavy on our senior leaders. The influence and importance of higher headquarters demands and requirements tend to escalate and gain momentum as they descend to subordinate echelons of command. This phenomena is compounded by the spread of information management systems which, rather than easing

administrative requirements, have had the reverse effect of expanding the demand for data input from lower levels. Additionally, these systems have institutionalized within the U.S. Army increasing micro-management and oversight of even the most mundane activities from an increasingly higher level. The truly effective senior leader must gain control of these detractors and he and his headquarters should serve as a buffer to enable subordinate units and their leaders to put their "go-to-war" philosophy into full time practice.

We must improve the cognitive ability of our junior leaders to deal with unforseen battlefield situations and place less emphasis on standardized learning solutions. We must further develop individual initiative, imagination, flexibility, adaptability and the capacity to operate autonomously. These crucial skills are products of both the command climate and the training environment.

The command climate established by the senior leader must be one which is truly decentralized, wherein subordinate leaders can exercise the skills mentioned above. Controls in this environment must be relaxed to the minimum necessary to insure standardization and task accomplishment. Values must be clearly stated and understood. Operational values must equate to stated values. Rational risk taking must be accepted as a standard procedural form and not as an exception to the norm. The rater/senior rater team must work diligently to counsel, nurture and assist their subordiantes as they develop. This team must be more definitive and effective at the sorting out of subordinate leaders, clearly distinguishing those who have further potential from those who do not.

The training environment should be realistic and innovative. Training technology must be maximized in this regard as we attempt to replicate battlefield conditions, especially during home station training. Rater and senior rater must work to inculcate the desired leadership skills through personal involvement in leader development programs and training. Subordinate leaders must be challenged continuously to apply those AirLand Battle skills which have been identified as prerequisites for success on the battlefield.

In conclusion, those measures which a senior leader must take in peacetime to insure that subordinate leaders are prepared for AirLand Battle are nothing revolutionary. The required supporting systems and methodologies are already in place or at least known to us. What is required is the resolute application of these systems and methodologies throughout the Army.

ENDNOTES

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 - 2. Morris Janowitz, Military Conflict, p.47.
- 3. David R. Segal, "Management, Leadership and the Future Battlefield", in <u>Leadership on the Future Battlefield</u>, ed. by James G. Hunt and John D. Blair, p. 210.
 - 4. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 211.
- 5. T. Owen Jacobs, "The AirLand Battle and Leadership Requirements", in <u>Leadership on the Future Battlefield</u>, ed. by James G. Hunt and John D. Blair, p. 24.
 - 6. Ibld, p. 26.
- 7. "AirLand Battle Future" Concept Paper, TRADOC Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: 1988.
- 8. Karl E. Weick, "A Stress Analysis of Future Battlefields", in <u>Leadership on the Future Battlefield</u>, ed. by James G. Hunt and John D. Blair, pp. 32-33.
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- 10. U.S. Department of the Army, <u>Field Manual 22-103</u>, "Leader-ship and Command at Senior Levels", p. 6. (Hereafter referred to as "FM 22-103").
- 11. U.S. Department of the Army, <u>Field Manual 25-100</u>, "Training the Force", (Final Draft) p. 7. (Hereafter referred to as "FM 25-100").
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 - 13. FM 25-100, p. 31.
 - 14. FM 22-103, p. 4
- 15. Douglas Southall Freeman, <u>Lee's Lieutenants</u>, Volume I, pp. 481-482.

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- 18. John G. Barrett, "General William Tecumseh Sherman: A Study in Leadership and Command", in <u>Military Leadership and Command:</u> The John Biggs Cincinnati Lectures 1987, p. 50.
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 States Army Command and General Staff College, p. 86.
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 - 21. General Omar Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 122.
 - 22. Hugh M. Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, p.16.
- 23. Nat Frankel and Larry Smith, <u>Patton's Best An Informal History of the 4th Armored Division</u>, pp. 180-181.
 - 24. B. H. Liddel Hart, History of the Second World War, p. 557.
 - 25. Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, p. 351.
 - 26. <u>Ibid</u>. p. 354.
 - 27. Russell F. Weigley, <u>Fisenhower's Lieutenants</u>, p. 439.
 - 28. Frankel and Smith, p. 182.
- 29. MG Walter F. Ulmer Jr., "Notes on Leadership for the 1980's", Military Review, July, 1980, p. 42.
 - 30. Jacobs, p. 27.
 - 31. Ibid. p. 28.
- 32. Sam Endicott and Earl Pence, NTC Leadership Lessons Learned, p. 16.
 - 33. <u>Ibid</u>. p. 17.
- 34. Herbert London, <u>Military Doctrine and the American</u> <u>Character - Reflections on AirLand Battle</u>, p. 58.
 - 35. FM 25-100, p. 50.

- 36. U.S. Department of the Army, <u>Pamphlet 600-80</u>, "Executive Leadership", p. 17. (Hereafter referred to as "DA Pam 600-80).
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